

ROOT privileges for web apps!

e les	- Mozilia Fileiox						<u> </u>	•
Test 🗙 🕂								
File:///home/dgruss/rowhammerjs/rowhammer.html		▼ C Q Searc	:h	★ 自	.	r e	∍ ≡	
320: 12 330: 9 340: 1 350: 0 360: 1 370: 2 380: 199 390: 76 400: 72 410: 231 420: 572 1250								
[!] Found flip (254 != 255) at array index 340	021386 when l	nammering inc	lices 339881984	4 and 340	15641	6		
[!] Found flip (239 != 255) at array index 340	022176 when h	nammering ind	lices 339881984	4 and 340	15641	6		
[!] Found flip (191 != 255) at array index 340	023138 when h	nammering ind	lices 339881984	4 and 340	15641	6		
[!] Found flip (254 != 255) at array index 340	025146 when h	nammering inc	lices 339881984	4 and 340	15641	6		-

DRAM organisation



DRAM organisation

10 10 10
837-10 P

ba	nk 0	
	row 0	
	row 1	
	row 2	
	row 32767	
	row buffer	



64k cells 1 capacitor, 1 transitor each



- Cells leak \rightarrow need refresh
- Max. refresh interval to guarantee data integrity
- Cells leak faster upon proximate accesses → Rowhammer



- Cells leak → need refresh
- Max. refresh interval to guarantee data integrity
- Cells leak faster upon proximate accesses → Rowhammer



- Cells leak \rightarrow need refresh
- Max. refresh interval to guarantee data integrity
- Cells leak faster upon proximate accesses → Rowhammer



- Cells leak → need refresh
- Max. refresh interval to guarantee data integrity
- Cells leak faster upon proximate accesses → Rowhammer



- Cells leak \rightarrow need refresh
- Max. refresh interval to guarantee data integrity
- Cells leak faster upon proximate accesses → Rowhammer



bit flips in row 2!

- Cells leak \rightarrow need refresh
- Max. refresh interval to guarantee data integrity
- Cells leak faster upon proximate accesses → Rowhammer

Row 0

Row 23

Page Table Example



Page Table Example



Page Table Example



















• DDR3 affected



- DDR4 affected
- Even ECC affected despite error correction!
 - Can SGX's integrity protection prevent Rowhammer?



AUGUST 5-6, 2020 Briefings

Flipping Bits from Software without Rowhammer

Kit Murdock, Daniel Gruss, David Oswald

#BHUSA @BLACKHATEVENTS





DVFS



Adrian Tang et al. "CLKSCREW: exposing the perils of security-oblivious energy management" In: USENIX Security Symposium 2017
CLKscrew attack

add.w	(a0)+,d1
cmp.l	a0,d0
bcc.s	loop
<pre>movea.l</pre>	#\$18E,a1
cmp.w	(a1),d1
bne.w	WrongChecks



Trustzone v normal world



CLKSCREW



- Infer secret AES key that was stored within Trustzone
- Trick Trustzone into loading a self-signed app

Pengfei Qiu et al. "VoltJockey: Breaching TrustZone by Software-Controlled Voltage Manipulation over Multi-core Frequencies" In: CCS 2019

What about Intel?



Intel® Extreme Tun	ina Utility								
	, outry							🔤 Monitoring 🔧	Settings 🛛 🔞 Help
System Information	Core							Core Default	
Manual Tuning	Reference Clock	⊕ ⊗ 103,2258 MH	z Max Non Tur					Reference Clock 101,0526 Mł	z 103,2258 MHz
All Controls							Max Non Turbo Boost Ratio Max Non-Turbo Boost CPU Sp.	Turbo Boost Ratio 34 x oo Boost CPU Sp 3,436 GHz	34 x 3,510 GHz
Graphics	re Turbo Boost Short Power Max Enable ③ aphics Directly Factor		Turbo Boost Short Power Max (0)		© 1200,0	000 W Max Turbo	Boost CPU Speed 4,042 GHz 1 Active Core 40 x	2 4,335 GHz 42 x	
Stress Test	Turbo Boost Power Max	ତ ⊗ 1050,000 N	/ Turbo Boost	Power Time Window		0,00097656 Set	conds	2 Active Cores 40 x 3 Active Cores 39 x	42 x 42 x
Profiles							Turbo	4 Active Cores 38 x Boost Power Max 1000.000 W	42 x 1050.000 W
	Core Current Limit	0 300,000	A Additional Tu	urbo Voltage		© 0,0000	00 mV Turbo Boost	Short Power Max 1200,000 W	1200,000 W Enable
							Turbo Boost P	ower Time Wind 0,00097656 :	50,00097656 S 300 000 A
	Multipliers						Additic	nal Turbo Voltage 0,00000 mV	0,00000 mV
	1 Active Core	⑥ 42 x ⊗						Graphics Default	Proposed A
	2 Active Cores	© 42 x ⊗					Processor Gr	aphies current El 500,000 A	500,000 A
	3 Active Cores	ⓓ 42 x ⊗							
	4 Active Cores	©							
		4 Active Cores							
		Default 38 x							
	Graphics	Proposed 42 x							
	Processor Graphics Current Limit	Limits the maximum ratio that the processor 300,000	Ą						
		can use while four cores are active.							
							Apply	Discard	▲ Save to Profile
							Forc	e Reboot	
37 °C				CPU Utilization	Memory Utilization 2708 MB	CPU Core Temperature 36 °C	CPU Throttling 0%	Processor Frequency 3 54 GHz	
CPU Utilization				Graphics Frequency	Active Core Count	CPLI Total TDP	IACore TDP	Graphics TDP	
Processor Frequency	Amman			354 MHz	1	16 W	10 W	0 W	
	1			Reference Clock Frequency	CPU Core Temperature 1	CPU Core Temperature 2	CPU Core Temperature 3	CPU Core Temperature 4	
2708 MB	A	~		101,0 MHz	30 1	50 °C	30 °C	30 °C	
CPU Total TDP	11		5 Minutes	Memory Frequency 1617 MHz					Compute



				(CPU-Tweaker 2.0			
TS 8.70 - Monitoring TECHP OVERUP Rig Performante Settinge Clock Modulation 100.0% Chipset Modulation 100.0% Set Multiplier 63 T	Cere 17-474 VID 0.7167 V 100.0010 MHt 100.0010 MHt 100.0010 MHt 100.0010 MHt 100.0010 MHt CPU info CPU info CPU info CPU model AMD CPU core AthIonX2	CPU Cache Mainboard Memo Processor Name AMD Opter Code Name Toledo Package Socke Technology 90 nm V AMD Specification Dual Core AN Family F Mod and Ext. Family F Ext. Mod	ory SPD About FX AMD OverDriv AMD2 Status Monitor Status Monitor CPU Status Board Status Logging	AMD OverDrive	CPU-Tweaker 2.0 Model AMD Phenom(tm) II X4 965 Processor CPUD Model AMD Phenom(tm) II X4 965 Processor CPUD Socket AM3 (941) Tech. 45 nm Cores/Threads 4 / 4 VCore 0.000 V MotherBoard Vendor ASUSTEK Computer INC. Model M4A88TD-M/USB3 Chipset AMD 785GX BIOS version 0902 Date 12/10/2010 officet Memory Type DDR3 Manufacturer Part Nb. Size 2 x 4096 Speed 1000 (63Mhz) @ 7.5.5.17- Chan. Unganged System Frequency Timings 1000 (63Mhz) 1000 (7.5.5.17- Chan. Unganged			
Power Saver Stop Di Disable Turbo SpeedS BD PROCHOT CLE Task Bar On Top Log File More D Save Options	PM features 2010.30 Core clock 2010.30 Throttle 2010.30 Core temp. 51.2* Current Multiplier (FID) 10.0x Req.Vcore (VID) 1.200V	Clocks (Core#0) Core Speed 2651.4 MHz Multiplier x 10.0 Bus Speed 265.1 MHz HT Link 795.4 MHz Selection Processor #1	Clock/Voltage Memory BEMP Fan Control AMD Smart Profiles Benchmark Stability Test Auto Clock v System Information Basic Detailed Diagram	< m	BCLK x 4.00 Cores x 4.00 UnCore x 10 HT x 10 RAM 3:10 EIST C1E Apply Save	200.9 MHz Chan 803.6 MHz CAS# 2008.9 MHz RAS# 2008.9 MHz RAS# 669.6 MHz Prect Turbo Comm reg.txt SubTim.	A VDimm 0.000 V # Latency (CL) 7 7 # to CAS# Delay (tRCD) 9 1 # Precharge (tRP) 9 9 # arge Delay (tRAS) 24 1 nand Rate (CR) 1T 1 spd About Exit	
	CPU 0 <u>CPU 1</u>	CPU-Z Save diagnostic info		Profile Information Profile Core 0 Multiplier Core 4 Multiplier HT ref. Clock CPU VID CPU VDD CPU VDDC Memory Clock	Core 1 Multiplier Core 5 Multiplier PCIe & Speed NB VID NB Core Voltage RAS to CAS Delay	Core 2 Multiplier IGP Speed Mem VDDQ NB PCIe & Voltage Command Rate OK CK	Core 3 Multiplier SidePort Speed Mem VTT CPU HT Voltage Row Cycle Time Cancel Apply Discard	

Intel Power Management



Static & dynamic voltage



Will it fault?

```
uint64_t multiplier
uint64_t correct
uint64_t var
```

// start undervolting

- $= 0 \times 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8;$
- = 0xdeadbeef*multiplier;
- = 0xdeadbeef*multiplier;

```
while ( var == correct )
{
     var = 0xdeadbeef * multiplier;
}
// stop undervolting
// Can we ever get here?
uint64_t flipped_bits = var ^ correct;
```



J

Intel SGX



Physical Memory





- Bit flips in the EPC?
- Integrity check fails!
- $\bullet \rightarrow \textbf{Lock up memory controller}$
- \rightarrow System halts immediately (no exploit, but DoS!)

Will Plundervolt work in SGX?

RSA Basics



RSA Signature/Decryption with CRT

$$n = p \times q \qquad d_p = d \mod p - 1$$

$$M = C^d \mod n \qquad d_q = d \mod q - 1$$

$$m_p = C^{dp} \mod p \qquad M'$$

$$m_q = C^{dq} \mod q$$

$$M = (p^{-1} \mod q) \times (m_q - m_p) \times p + m_p$$

Fault Attack on CRT-RSA



- Bellcore: gcd(M' M, n)
- Lenstra: gcd((*M'*)^e *C*, *n*)
- yields *p* or *q* (and dividing *n* by it gives the other)

RSA Decryption

```
// Start undervolting
uint8_t rsa_dec_ecall(int iterations)
{
    //Waitforfirstfault
    trigger_fault(iterations);
    //Actualdecryption
    ippsRSA_Decrypt(ct,dec,pPrv,scratchBuffer);
}
// Stop undervolting
```

bagger> dog Enclave/encl

What else can we break?

AES basics

- Symmetric key crypto
- Encrypt messages for transfer over public channel and data for (untrusted) storage
- 4 ×4 byte state, 10 rounds: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey
- HW-accelerated with AES-NI



AES inside SGX

Instruction	Description
AESENC	Perform one round of an AES encryption flow
AESENCLAST	Perform the last round of an AES encryption flow
AESDEC	Perform one round of an AES decryption flow
AESDECLAST	Perform the last round of an AES decryption flow
AESKEYGENASSIST	Assist in AES round key generation
AESIMC	Assist in AES Inverse Mix Columns
PCLMULQDQ	Carryless multiply (CLMUL)

Differential Fault Analysis Attack

Differential Fault Attack on AES



Proof-of-concept

```
// Start undervolting
do
{
    plaintext=
```

```
plaintext= <randomlygenerated>;
result1=aes128_encryption(plaintext);
```

```
result2=aes128_encryption(plaintext);
```

```
} while(result1 == result2)
```

```
// Stop undervolting
```

bagger> sudo ./aes-encrypt 100000 -262

It's not just crypto!

struct_foo_t *foo = &arr[offset]; foo->foo = enclave_secret;

Memory Corruption



Creating enclave... ==== Victim Enclave ==== [pt.c] /dev/sgx-step opened! Enclave Base: 0x7f001a000000

Voltage 0.584V

Undervolting -235mV

How difficult to fault is it?
Idle & crash voltage – Intel(R) Core i3-7100U CPU



ker 1 unab 1 80.7 21 I lear e er x7/0

eNo

80.7479361 PGD 11513f067 P4D 11513f067 PUD 115143067 PTE 8000000272173061

6. uela

h

80.7479821 Dops: 0003 [#11 SMP PTI

(alcilat n:

u

Indet

uo l rng

80.7480041 Modules linked in: com vtsspp(OE) xt_CHECKSUM jptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_mat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_mat_nt_ipv4 nf_mat_sep5(OE) nf_commtrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_commtrack_nf_commtrack_libcrc32c_ipt_REJECT nf_rej ect jpu4 xt (cpudp bridge stp llc ebtable filter ebtables ip6table filter ip6_tables deulink iptable_filter pci_stub vboxpci(OE) socperf3(OE) vboxnetadp(OE) vboxnetf1(OE) 12tp_ppp vboxdrv(OE) 12tp_netlink 12tp_core ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel] pppox unnet(DE) aufs une_usock unci_transport usock xfrm_user xfrm_tunnel tunnel ipcomp xfrm_ipcomp esp4 and af_key xfrm_algo une unci unnon(DE) overlay arc4 pax(DE) cmac bmep muidia_uum(PDE) hid_multitouch dell_umi dell_smbios_umi uni intel_wmi_thunderbolt_dell_wmi_descriptor mxm_wmi_snd_hda_codec_hdmi_intel_rapl_uvcvideo hmof

n 6

1:

×¥

41

L L LX

ED)

10 %





18

) U lan

AQ.

S-MI b

Idle, error & crash voltages – Intel Core i3-7100U



Error & crash voltages – Intel Core i3-7100U



Faulting

Code Name	Model No	Frequency Tested		
Skylake	i7-6700K	2.0GHz		
Kaby Lake	i7-7700HQ	2.0GHz		
	i3-7100U-A	1.0GHz		
	i3-7100U-B	2.0GHz		
	i3-7100U-C	2.0GHz		
Kaby Lake-R	i7-8650U-A	1.9GHz		
	i7-8650U-B	1.9GHz		
	i7-8550U	2.6GHz		
Coffee Lake-R	i9-9900U	3.6GHz		

Two Intel Core i3-7100U CPUs





Two Intel Core i3-7100U CPUs



All faults were injected at normal ambient temperature

More undervolting

- Idle cores
- More crashes!

Less undervolting

- Cores maxed
- Fewer crashes

1 2 3 4			19.5%] 15.9%] 27.2%] 22.9%]	5 6 7 8		17. 13. 26. 15.	2%] 2%] 7%] 5%]
-		/bin/bach 7/y32			—	/bin/bash 57x34	
vers	atile\$	/bin/bash 74x32			₽ versatile\$	/bin/bash 57x34	

Faulting some random stuff

8

versatile\$./operation -m 200 -s -177 -X 5 -i 200 -o P -c "cat backup<u>/text file.txt" -r 0 -t 8</u>

Summary

time (ms) interval: 200 Iterations: 200

Start Voltage: -177 End Voltage: \odot Stop after x drops: 5 Voltage steps: 1 Threads: 8 Operand1: Operand2: Operand1 is: maximum Operand2 is: maximum Operand1 min is:

Operand2 min is: 0x6 Calculation only: No Display calculation: No

Verbose: Option: Command Line options

> Command line:

> Result code:

2000 -177 0 5 1 8 0x000000ffffffff 0x000000fffffffff maximum maximum 0x0000000000000000 0x00000000000000 No No No Yes

Command Line

0

cat backup/text_file.txt

cat

/bin/bash 158x41

Concurrent work

Kenjar, Zijo et al "V0LTpwn: Attacking x86 Processor Integrity from Software" In: USENIX Security Symposium 2020

Qiu, P at al. "Breaking SGX by software-controlled voltage-induced hardware faults." In AsianHOST 2019





- A new type of attack against Intel
- Breaks the integrity of SGX
- Within SGX
 - Retrieve keys using AES-NI
 - Retrieve RSA key
 - Induce memory corruption in bug free code
 - Make enclave write secrets to untrusted memory

Acknowledgements



This research is partially funded by the Research Fund KU Leuven, and by the Agency for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Flanders). Jo Van Bulck is supported by a grant of the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO). This research is partially funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) under grants EP/R012598/1, EP/R008000/1, and by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreements No. 779391 (FutureTPM) and No. 681402 (SOPHIA).

