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| Date | Name | INFO |
CATEGORY |
SUBCATE |
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29.7.26 |
HAWK-n Key Recovery Reduces to SVP in Dimension n/2 + 1 |
HAWK is a lattice signature scheme that is currently a
thirdround candidate in NIST’s post-quantum signature competition. We give an unconditional, deterministic polynomial-time reduction from HAWKn key recovery over Kn = Q(ζ2ℓ ) to poly(n) calls to an exact Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) oracle in dimension n/2 + 1, where n = 2ℓ−1 is the ring degree. |
PAPERS | CRYPTO |
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29.7.26 |
HAWK: Having Automorphisms Weakens Key | The search rank-2 module Lattice Isomorphism Problem (smLIP), over a cyclotomic ring of degree a power of two, can be reduced to an instance of the Lattice Isomorphism Problem (LIP) of at most half the rank if an adversary knows a nontrivial automorphism of the underlying integer lattice. | PAPERS | CRYPTO |
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29.7.26 |
HAWK | HAWK is a signature scheme inspired by the introduction of the lattice isomorphism problem (LIP) to signatures [DvW22], and this specification document is based on the article that first described a practical variant [DPPvW22a]. | PAPERS | CRYPTO |
| 30.6.26 | Leaky Apps: Large-scale Analysis of Secrets Distributed inAndroid and iOS Apps | Mobile apps store various types of secrets to support their func-tionalities. These include API keys, and cryptographic material toauthenticate users and access backend services. Once distributed,attackers can reverse-engineer the apps, and these secrets becomeaccessible, posing risks such as data leaks, and service abuse | PAPERS | CRYPTO |
| 3.5.26 | New developments in password hashing: ROM-port-hard functions | These are the slides we used at ZeroNights 2012. In a sense, this presentation is a continuation of Password security: past, present, future (PHDays 2012, Passwords^12) and Password hashing at scale (YaC 2012), and it is continued with yescrypt: password hashing scalable beyond bcrypt and scrypt (PHDays 2014), so please check those out as well. | PAPERS | CRYPTO |
| 3.5.26 | Password hashing at scale | These are the slides we used at YaC 2012. In a sense, this presentation is a continuation of Password security: past, present, future (PHDays 2012, Passwords^12) and it is continued with New developments in password hashing: ROM-port-hard functions (ZeroNights 2012) and yescrypt: password hashing scalable beyond bcrypt and scrypt (PHDays 2014), so please check those out as well. | PAPERS | CRYPTO |
| 3.5.26 | Password security: past, present, future | These are the slides we used at PHDays 2012 and Passwords^12 (with major updates). In a sense, this presentation is continued with Password hashing at scale (YaC 2012) and New developments in password hashing: ROM-port-hard functions (ZeroNights 2012), so please check those out as well, although the most relevant material from them has been merged into the Passwords^12 revision of this presentation. | PAPERS | CRYPTO |
| 17.2.26 | Zero Knowledge (About) Encryption: A Comparative Security Analysis of Three Cloud-based Password Managers | Zero Knowledge Encryption is a term widely used by vendors of cloud-based password managers. Although it has no strict technical meaning, the term conveys the idea that the server, who stores encrypted password vaults on behalf of users, is unable to learn anything about the contents of those vaults. | PAPERS | CRYPTO |