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DATE

NAME

INFO

CATEGORY

SUBCATEGORIES
18.12.24 Earth Koshchei Earth Koshchei Coopts Red Team Tools in Complex RDP Attacks APT APT
17.12.24 BITTER APT BITTER APT Targets Chinese Government Agency APT APT
17.12.24 Mask APT Careto is back: what’s new after 10 years of silence? APT APT
11.12.24 Rakshasa  Likely China-based Attackers Target High-profile Organizations in Southeast Asia APT APT
04.12.24 Snowblind Snowblind: The Invisible Hand of Secret Blizzard APT APT
03.12.24 Kimsuky  Analysis of Kimsuky Threat Actor's Email Phishing Campaign APT APT

27.11.24

APT-C-60

Attacks by the attack group APT-C-60 using legitimate services

 APT APT

22.11.24

APT-K-47

Unveiling the Past and Present of APT-K-47 Weapon: Asyncshell

 APT APT

28.10.24

 Lazarus APT The Crypto Game of Lazarus APT: Investors vs. Zero-days APT APT

27.10.24

 SideWinder Beyond the Surface: the evolution and expansion of the SideWinder APT group APT APT

3.8.24

 APT28 Today, APT28 is consistently attributed to GRU Unit 26165, 85th Main Special Service Centre (GTsSS) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU). This attribution is mainly based on an indictment unsealed by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) in 2018. APT APT

3.8.24

 Fighting Ursa A Russian threat actor we track as Fighting Ursa advertised a car for sale as a lure to distribute HeadLace backdoor malware. The campaign likely targeted diplomats and began as early as March 2024. Fighting Ursa (aka APT28, Fancy Bear and Sofacy) has been associated with Russian military intelligence and classified as an advanced persistent threat (APT). APT APT

3.8.24

 APT41 APT41 likely compromised Taiwanese government-affiliated research institute with ShadowPad and Cobalt Strike APT APT

2.8.24

Turla

Turla: A Master’s Art of Evasion

 APT APT

19.7.24

 APT41 APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST APT APT

17.7.24

 DeputyDog Italian government agencies and companies in the target of a Chinese APT APT APT

17.7.24

 FIN7 Reboot FIN7 Reboot | Cybercrime Gang Enhances Ops with New EDR Bypasses and Automated Attacks APT APT

9.7.24

 APT40 People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action APT APT

8.7.24

 CloudSorcerer CloudSorcerer – A new APT targeting Russian government entities APT APT
14.6.24 Arid Viper Arid Viper poisons Android apps with AridSpy APT APT
14.6.24 Arid Viper Arid Viper | APT’s Nest of SpyC23 Malware Continues to Target Android Devices APT APT

17.5.24

 Kimsuky Kimsuky APT attack discovered using Facebook & MS management console APT APT
14.5.24 Swan Vector Unveiling Swan Vector APT Targeting Taiwan and Japan with varied DLL Implants APT APT

7.5.24

APT42

Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations

 APT APT
23.4.24 APT28 Analyzing Forest Blizzard’s custom post-compromise tool for exploiting CVE-2022-38028 to obtain credentials APT APT
23.4.24 ToddyCat We continue covering the activities of the APT group ToddyCat.This time, we have investigated how attackers obtain constant access to compromised infrastructure, what information on the hosts they are interested in, and what tools they use to extract it. APT APT

28.2.24

APT29

SVR cyber actors adapt tactics for initial cloud access

 APT APT
17.2.24 Water Hydra Water Hydra’s Zero-Day Attack Chain Targets Financial Traders APT APT

29.1.24

 Midnight Blizzard Midnight Blizzard: Guidance for responders on nation-state attack APT APT